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Comment

Holmes and the Erosion of Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction over Patent Claims
Timothy E. Grimsrud*
In the federal judicial system, the authority of courts
inferior to the United States Supreme Court is limited to the
boundaries prescribed by Congress.' With respect to cases
arising under patent law, Congress gave exclusive original
jurisdiction to the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 13382 and exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of3
Appeals for the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
Interestingly, interpretation of the two statutes turns largely
on the meaning of "arising under" in § 1338 due to the
dependence of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction on
the existence of original jurisdiction in the federal district

* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S., 2000,
University of Wisconsin-Madison; B.A., 1999, St. Olaf College. I would like to
thank the Editors and Staff Members of the Minnesota Law Review for their
efforts in the publication of this Comment. In particular, thanks to Rachel
Clark Hughey, Amy Salmela, and Steve McLaird for their editorial assistance.
Finally, I would like to extend a special thanks to my wife, Amy, for her
constant support and encouragement.
1. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) ("Courts created by statute can
have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.").
2. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts
of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases." 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
3. The text reads,
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a district
court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction of that court was

based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title, except that a
case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to
copyrights, exclusive rights in mask works, or trademarks and no
other claim under section 1338(a) shall be governed by sections 1291,
1292, and 1294 of this title.
Id. § 1295(a).
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court. 4 Until recently, courts interpreted both statutes to
create exclusive federal jurisdiction over cases involving
nonfrivolous patent claims alleged in a complaint or in a
counterclaim.5 In June 2002, however, the United States
Supreme Court overruled this practice in Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., in which it held that
§ 1295 did not create exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the
Federal Circuit over a compulsory patent counterclaim. 6
Depriving the Federal Circuit of exclusive jurisdiction over
patent counterclaims is problematic because it undermines the
Federal Circuit's objective of creating uniformity and
predictability in the application of patent law. 7 Furthermore,
any resulting regional discrepancies in the application of patent
law by the federal circuit courts of appeals will now provide an
incentive for a manipulative plaintiff to forum shop throughout
the federal circuits. 8 The implication of Holmes at the trial
court level is even more alarming because it provides state
courts with a basis for retaining jurisdiction over compulsory
patent counterclaims. 9 Allowing state courts to entertain
patent claims will only further unsettle patent law,10 which will
4. See supra notes 2-3.
5. See infra Part I.B.3.
6. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct.
1889, 1893 (2002).
7. See infra Part I.A.2.
8. See infra Part III.C.
Prior to the Holmes decision, regional
discrepancies in patent law among the federal district courts already provided
an incentive for forum shopping. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Forum
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 83 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 558, 569-88 (2001) (describing how the
procedural and substantive differences among the district courts provided a
forum-shopping incentive).
The Holmes decision will likely increase the
prevelance of this forum shopping because the Federal Circuit will no longer
have jurisdiction to review cases in which the only patent claim was raised in
a patent counterclaim. See Anne M. Maher, The 'Holmes' Decision, NAT'L L.J.,

July 8, 2002, at Bll (describing how the forum-shopping problem is worsened
by the Federal Circuit's lack of appellate jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims).
9. The Indiana Supreme Court reached this precise conclusion with
respect to compulsory copyright counterclaims in Green v. Hendrickson
Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 793-94 (Ind. 2002). Note that although
§ 1295 refers to exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under
patent and plant variety protection law, § 1338 refers to exclusive original
jurisdiction over patent, plant variety protection, and copyright law. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1295(a), 1338(a) (2000).

10. See Edward H. Cooper, State Law of Patent Exploitation, 56 MINN. L.
REV. 313, 380 (1972) (indicating that the adjudication of patent claims in state
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in turn exacerbate the forum-shopping problem. I I Finally, in2
view of the economic significance attributed to patents,
unsettling the predictability of patent law and providing an
incentive for forum shopping is threatening to the economy and
to technological innovation. 13
This Comment explains the rationale behind Congress's
choice to remove the adjudication of patent claims to the
exclusive province of the federal courts and describes how the
Holmes decision will subvert the policy behind this choice. Part
I provides an overview of the original and appellate subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts in patent cases. Part II
describes the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes. Part III
analyzes the accuracy and propriety of the Court's holding in
view of prior court decisions, legislative history, and public
policy. Part IV proposes the correct interpretation of § 1295
and § 1338 and concludes that because it is unlikely the Court
will reverse itself in the near future, Congress must enact
legislation clarifying its intent that only federal courts can
exercise jurisdiction over patent claims regardless of whether
the claim appears in a complaint or counterclaim.

court would lead to even more disparities in the application of patent law
because state judges may lack patent law expertise); Moore, supra note 8, at

592 (explaining that "unpredictability in the legal system... intensifies as the
number of potential jurisdictions in which to bring suit increases"). Note that
even among the federal district courts, the difficulty of consistently applying
patent law has led commentators to advocate for the creation of a specialized

patent trial court. Cooper, supra, at 380; Moore, supra note 8, at 596-98.
11.

See

infra text accompanying

notes

199-201,

213-19 (describing

scenarios in which the Holmes decision will foster forum shopping among the
state courts).
12. See, e.g., Megan Barnett, Patents Pending, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 10, 2002, at 33 (explaining how Eli Lilly lost approximately one-third of

its market capitalization following a Federal Circuit decision invalidating one
of its patents), available at 2002 WL 8430613; Marc S. Friedman, A Plan: The
Key to Protection, 11 N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 1833
(estimating that intellectual property constitutes ten percent of the gross
domestic product and twenty percent of corporate assets), available at WL
9/23/02 NJLNP 9; Thomas A. Stewart, Get a Grip: Grab the Knowledge and
Squeeze, FORTUNE, Nov. 8, 1999, at 322 (indicating that Microsoft, Intel, and

Dell have relied on their patents and copyrights in maintaining their
dominant presence in the marketplace), available at 1999 WL 27632994.
13. See Moore, supra note 8, at 592-95 (describing how regional variations

in patent law encourage forum shopping, which in turn decreases the value of
patents, and thus the incentive for innovation).
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I. THE JURISDICTIONAL BASIS OF PATENT CLAIMS
In order to obtain a patent for an invention, a patentee
must successfully prosecute a patent application through the
United States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO). 14 Upon
issuance of a patent, a patentee obtains the right to exclude
others from practicing the invention for a specified term. 15 This
exclusive right allows the patentee to enforce the patent
against unauthorized users through an action for patent
infringement. 16
At the same time, under appropriate
circumstances, a third party wishing to practice a patented
invention may bring a declaratory judgment action for
invalidity or noninfringement against a patentee.1 7 In either
situation, the federal district courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction. 18 With respect to appeals, the Federal Circuit
exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of
the district courts on patent claims. 19 As a forum of last resort,
a litigant may appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit to the
20
United States Supreme Court.
Although patent claims must be filed in the federal district
court, determining when a claim actually "arises under" patent
law is more complicated. It is generally accepted, for example,
that a claim that merely invokes patent law as one of multiple
theories of recovery does not arise under patent law. 2' The
United States Supreme Court also recently held that a patent
22
counterclaim does not arise under patent law.

14. See generally ROBERT B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 3-4 (2d ed. 1993); HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE
9-38 (3d. ed. 2001) (providing an overview of the patent prosecution process
and the structure of the PTO).
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 271 (2000).
16. Id. § 271; SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 39-42.
17. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 42-44.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
19. Id. § 1295(a).
20. See infra note 44 (describing the constitutional limits of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction); see also ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD
DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 50 figs. 1-5, 53-54 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining

civil procedure in the context of patent litigation).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
22. See infra Part II.
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A. ORIGINAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PATENT
CLAIMS

The requirement that a court have subject matter
jurisdiction before entertaining a lawsuit is a fundamental
edict of civil procedure jurisprudence. 23
Subject matter
jurisdiction confers power over the court to hear and render a
decision on the subject matter of a particular case. 24 As set
forth in Article III, section 1 of the Constitution, it is Congress's
role to establish the jurisdiction of the federal courts inferior to
the United States Supreme Court.25 The interpretation and
application of Congress's determinations, however, is in the
province of the judiciary. 26 Even when the issue is not raised
by a litigant, courts have an affirmative duty to initiate an
27
inquiry into the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
1. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule: Striking the Balance
Between Federal and State Sovereignty
Provided that the federal courts possess subject matter
jurisdiction, 28 a plaintiff may ordinarily file a claim in either
state or federal court due to concurrent jurisdiction between
23. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (explaining
that subject matter jurisdiction keeps the federal courts "within the bounds
the Constitution and Congress have prescribed"); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
506, 514 (1868) ("Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any
cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist,
the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause."); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it
appears ...that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action.").
24. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514.
25. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("All federal courts,
other than the Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the
exercise of the authority to 'ordain and establish' inferior courts.") (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
26. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (explaining that "[iut
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is").
27. Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) ("[Tlhe
first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and
then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is
bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested.").
28. Federal subject matter jurisdiction can be established in two ways:
diversity of citizenship between the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), or the
presence of a federal question, id. § 1331. Supplemental jurisdiction is a third
way to establish federal jurisdiction, although it requires that the court
already possess original jurisdiction based on either a federal question or
diversity of citizenship. Id. § 1367.
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the state and federal judicial systems. 29 As a result of
concurrent jurisdiction, federal courts must carefully construe
their jurisdiction so as to not deprive a sovereign state of a
matter otherwise within its jurisdiction. 30 Determinations of
the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction consequently
involve balancing federal and state sovereignty concerns, and
more specifically, deciphering the limitations on the power of
the federal courts sitting in a sovereign state. 31 Leaving aside
the issue of diversity of citizenship as a basis for jurisdiction, 32
federal question jurisdiction maintains this balance as codified
33
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In enacting § 1331, Congress did not clearly demark the
jurisdiction of the federal courts due to the ambiguity
surrounding the import of "arising under" as it appears in the
statute. 34 This has allowed the judiciary to play a prominent
role in determining the circumstances that raise a federal
question. 35 These judicial interpretations of § 1331 have
29. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876) (explaining that,
unless Congress has enacted a law granting exclusive federal jurisdiction,
concurrent jurisdiction exists, and the plaintiff can file suit in either state or
federal court).
30. Cf Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 552-53 (1989) (explaining
that with respect to removal of a case from state to federal court, "[d]ue regard
for the rightful independence of state governments ... requires that [federal
courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which
the statute has defined").
31. See S. & E. Bldg. Materials Co. v. Joseph P. Day, Inc., 188 F. Supp.
742, 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (explaining that jurisdiction is an issue of power,
requiring a weighing of federal and state sovereignty interests); John Donofrio
& Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The
Application of Federal Question Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction
Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835, 1863 (1996) ("Counseling in favor of a
narrow interpretation of federal jurisdiction is a general notion of the
usurpation of state authority. . .
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
33. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
§ 1331.
34. Id.
35. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (affirming the
established principle that artful pleading or anticipation of a defense will not
establish a claim "arising under" the Constitution or federal law); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (explaining that federal
jurisdiction exists when a plaintiff states a claim based on federal law or the
Constitution); Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 31, at 1841-49; Emmette F.
Hale, III, The 'Arising Under' Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An
Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 232-36
(1986) (explaining how court interpretations have restricted Congress's

2003]

JURISDICTION OVER PATENT CLAIMS

2139

evolved into the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which dictates
that "[tlhe presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction"
is determined by whether "a federal question is presented on
36
the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint."
Accordingly, provided that the plaintiff properly pleads a
federal question of law, 37 the plaintiff is the master of the
38
complaint and controls the forum for the lawsuit.
2. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction over Patent Claims
Departing from the standard of concurrent jurisdiction,
Congress has created exclusive federal jurisdiction in several
areas of the law. 39 In particular, Congress conferred exclusive
jurisdiction over patents, plant variety protection, and
copyright cases on the federal district courts when it enacted 28
U.S.C. § 1338.40 The statute provides that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arisingunder
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety
protection, copyrights and trademarks," and that "[s]uch
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in
patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases."4 1 With
respect to patent claims, it is generally believed that Congress
created exclusive jurisdiction to promote uniformity and
42
expertise in the application of patent law.
otherwise broad grant of federal question jurisdiction).
36. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
37. A federal question exists if a federal question created the plaintiffs
cause of action, or the plaintiffs cause of action necessarily requires the
resolution of a question of federal law. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
38. Caterpillar,482 U.S. at 392; Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25
(1913).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (antitrust actions); id. § 78aa (securities and
exchange actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000) (bankruptcy); id. § 1338 (patent,
plant variety protection, and copyright actions).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of JurisdictionBetween State
and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 658 (1971)
(explaining that patent infringement actions are of enormous importance
because "they concern the scope of federally sanctioned monopolies"); Dutch D.
Chung, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Adjudication of Patent Issues and
the Federal Courts' Choice of Preclusion Laws, 69 FoRDHAM L. REV. 707, 721
(2000); Cooper, supra note 10, at 315 (explaining that federal courts are better
equipped than state courts to handle the complexity of patent litigation, and
that the public has an interest in the uniform interpretation of monopolies);
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Interpretation of § 1338 has hinged on the meaning
attributed to the phrase "arising under."43 Depending upon its
context, "arising under" has two significantly different
meanings. 44 A broad interpretation of "arising under" confers
subject matter jurisdiction consonant with Article III of the
Constitution, whereas a narrower interpretation limits "arising
45
under" to the confines of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
With respect to § 1338, the Article III interpretation of "arising
under" would give federal district courts jurisdiction over any
case in which an issue of patent, plant variety protection, or
copyright law was raised, regardless of whether it was raised in
the complaint, answer, or counterclaim. 46 Alternately, an
interpretation limited to the well-pleaded complaint rule would
only grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases
where a federal question of patent, plant variety protection, or
copyright law was raised on the face of the plaintiffs well47
pleaded complaint.
Most courts have interpreted § 1338 "arising under" to
48
encompass some notion of the well-pleaded complaint rule,
Note, Exclusive Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70
HARV. L. REV. 509, 511 (1957) [hereinafter Exclusive Jurisdiction] (stating
that exclusive jurisdiction may decrease the number of conflicting decisions).
43. See Chisum, supra note 42, at 635-44 (depicting the two possible
jurisdiction schemes created by § 1338(a) and "arising under," namely original
jurisdiction consonant with the Article III interpretation versus original
jurisdiction defined by the well-pleaded complaint rule); see also Christianson
v. Cold Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-11 (1988) (analyzing the
meaning of "arising under").
44. In defining the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, the
Constitution states that the judicial power "shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties ....
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). This has been
interpreted to mean that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all cases
that raise a federal question, regardless of whether the federal question is on
the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See generally Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (exercising subject matter jurisdiction where
the plaintiff had failed to raise a federal question for purposes of the wellpleaded complaint rule). The other "arising under" context pertains to
jurisdiction predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, in which case the well-pleaded
complaint rule governs. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 33-38, 44.
46. See supra note 44.
47. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
48. E.g., Christianson,486 U.S. at 809 (explaining that even if a defense
is the only question at issue in a case, the defense is insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of § 1338); see also Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 168 U.S.
255, 261 (1897) (stating that it is "well established that any defence [sic] which
goes to the validity of the patent is available in the state courts").
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though few federal authorities have directly addressed the
issue in the context of counterclaims. 49 On several occasions
the Federal Circuit has indicated that state courts lack the
authority to hear a suit involving a patent counterclaim. 50 In
Schwarzkopf Development Corp. v. Ti-Coating,Inc., the Federal
Circuit stated that "[aidjudication of a patent counterclaim is
the exclusive province of the federal courts." 5 1 Additionally, in
Aerojet-General Corp. v.Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle
Ltd., the Federal Circuit's statement that a "well-pleaded
counterclaim" has an "independent federal jurisdictional basis"
implied that a state court could not exercise jurisdiction over
patent counterclaims. 52 Through their continued refusal to
49. A counterclaim is a claim filed in response to an opposing party's
claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)-(b).
Counterclaims are characterized as
compulsory or permissive. Id. A compulsory counterclaim is a counterclaim
that arises out of the same "transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim." FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). Courts have
interpreted this to mean that when there is a logical relationship between the
counterclaim and the opposing party's claim, the counterclaim is compulsory.
E.g., Gilldorn Sav. Ass'n v. Commerce Sav. Ass'n, 804 F.2d 390, 396 (7th Cir.
1986); Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1978).
Therefore, any counterclaim that does not have a logical relationship with the
opposing party's claim is permissive.
Characterizing the counterclaim as compulsory or permissive can have
significant procedural implications. In general, whenever a plaintiff files a
claim against a defendant the defendant may bring a permissive counterclaim.
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b). The only proviso is that the court must have
independent jurisdiction over the counterclaim. E.g., East-Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning, 888 F.2d 1576, 1578
(11th Cir. 1989). Alternatively, the defendant could also choose to withhold
the counterclaim and file it in a subsequent lawsuit. Conversely, a defendant
must bring a compulsory counterclaim or suffer claim preclusion in a
subsequent lawsuit. Mesker Bros. Iron Co. v. Donata Corp., 401 F.2d 275, 279
(4th Cir. 1968). Due to the lack of discretion in filing the counterclaim, and
the close relationship between the original claim and the counterclaim, the
court will exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim. See,
e.g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974); Zahn v.
Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 306 (1973).
As a result, a compulsory
counterclaim does not need an independent jurisdictional basis.
50. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
51. 800 F.2d 240, 244 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
52. 895 F.2d 736, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The court further stated, however,
that its decision had no bearing on the removal of patent infringement
counterclaims from state court. Id. at 739. Although the Federal Circuit did
not analyze the propriety of the decision, the court recognized Rath Packing
Co. v. Becker, in which the Ninth Circuit held that filing a patent infringement
counterclaim in state court will not, by itself, justify removal to federal court.
Id. at 739 n.4 (citing Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.
1975) (Rich, J., sitting by designation), affd on other grounds sub nom., Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)).
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exercise jurisdiction over patent or copyright counterclaims, 53
state courts also appeared to accept the § 1338 interpretation
depriving them of jurisdiction. 54
Not surprisingly,
commentators disagree as to whether § 1338 "arising under"
invokes the well-pleaded complaint rule, or some modified
version.55
B. APPELLATE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PATENT
CLAIMS

In 1982, in reaction largely to the lack of uniformity in the
56
application of patent law among the circuit courts of appeals, 57
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
By providing the Federal Circuit with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over patent claims, Congress intended to create a
uniform body of patent law and reduce the pervasive forum

53. Exclusive jurisdiction under § 1338 applies to claims arising under
patent, plant variety protection, and copyright and trademark law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (2000).
54. See, e.g., Tewarson v. Simon, 750 N.E.2d 176, 183 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that the state had no jurisdiction over a counterclaim sounding in
copyright law); EMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Lincoln, 691 So.2d 547, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (affirming the lower court's dismissal of a copyright infringement
counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v.
Norden Labs., Inc., No. 11615, 1992 WL 368604, at 3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 1992)
("[Tihere is no corresponding authority for state courts to exercise ancillary
jurisdiction over counterclaims which, if brought as independent actions in
state court, would have to be dismissed as being within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts."); Superior Clay Corp. v. Clay Sewer Pipe
Ass'n, 215 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ohio Com. P1. 1963) (holding that the federal
district court has exclusive jurisdiction over a counterclaim for patent
infringement); Pleatmaster v. Consol. Trimming Corp., 156 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) ("A counterclaim is equivalent to an affirmative action
brought by a litigant and the relief requested is of the same nature as the
judgment demanded in a complaint. A state court does not have jurisdiction of
the subject of such a counterclaim and the counterclaim must accordingly be
dismissed.").
55. Compare Chisum, supra note 42, at 633-44 (explaining that, although
an Article III interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1338 "arising under" is too broad,
the well-pleaded complaint rule interpretation of "arising under" is too
narrow), and Joseph R. Re, Federal Circuit Jurisdiction over Appeals from
District Court Patent Decisions, 16 AIPLA Q. J. 169, 177-78 (1988) (indicating
that the federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims), with Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 31, at 1873-74
(explaining that when a case is properly in state court, a compulsory patent
counterclaim should not deprive the state court ofjurisdiction).
56. See infra Part I.B.1.
57. See infra Part I.B.2.
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shopping that existed throughout the circuit courts. 58
1. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Crisis
Prior to 1982, the federal circuit courts of appeals had
subject matter jurisdiction over final decisions of the district
courts on patent claims. 59 For a variety of reasons, predicating
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals on the geographic
location of patent lawsuits proved problematic. 60 The most
notable problem was the forum shopping that resulted from the
61
inconsistent application of patent law among the circuits.
Furthermore, the already burdened Supreme Court could not
ameliorate the problem of forum shopping because the Court
a predictable and
could not hear enough cases to establish
62
geographically neutral body of patent law.
The uncertainty and variation in the application of the law
created a situation in which plaintiffs would file suit in
particular circuits known to be proponents or opponents of the
patent system. 63 One judge described the situation as a race
58.

S. REP. No. 97-275, at 19 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,

29.
59. Unless Congress has stated otherwise, the federal circuit courts of
appeals take appellate jurisdiction of final decisions of the district courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
60. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12
(indicating that the courts of appeals had difficulty in both efficiently applying
patent law and maintaining uniformity in its application); see also H.R. REP.
97-312, at 17 (1981), microformed on CIS No. 81-H523-22 (Cong. Info. Serv.)
(describing the general problem of overburdened federal appellate courts).
61. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800,
813 (1988) (recognizing that one of Congress's goals in creating the Federal
Circuit was to reduce uncertainty in the application of patent law);
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and
Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 200 (1975)
[hereinafter Federal Court Appellate System] (explaining that "the perceived
disparity in results in different circuits leads to widespread forum shopping");
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 777 (4th ed. 1998)
("In creating the Federal Circuit, congressional emphasis was on the need for
greater uniformity in patent law and for freeing the judicial process from the
forum shopping caused by conflicting patent decisions of the regional
circuits."); Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 31, at 1849 ("One of the strongest
motivations for creating the court was the general dissatisfaction over the
disparate application of the patent laws by the various regional circuits.").
62. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
63. See H.R. REP. 97-312, at 21, microformed on CIS No. 81-H523-22
(Cong. Info. Serv.) (stating that the lack of uniformity in the circuit courts
application of patent law, and the varying attitudes toward patents generally,
created "'mad and undignified races' between alleged infringers and patent
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"between a patentee who wishe[d] to sue for infringement in
one circuit believed to be benign toward patents, and a user
who want[ed] to obtain a declaration of invalidity or noninfringement in one believed to be hostile to" patents. 64 As a
result, the scope of a patentee's property rights, which
consisted of a national right to exclude competitors, often
depended upon the particular geographical forum in which suit
65

was filed.

2. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 and the
Creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Due to concerns regarding the uncertainty and disparate
application of patent law, 66 Congress decided to consolidate the
appellate review of district court decisions through the creation
of the Federal Circuit. 67 In particular, Congress believed that
an exclusive court of appeals for patent claims would "alleviate
the serious problems of forum shopping among the regional
courts of appeals." 68 This intent is codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a), which states that for patent and plant variety
holders to be the first to institute proceedings in the forum they considered
most favorable" to their situation).
64. Federal Court Appellate System, 67 F.R.D. 195, 200 (1975) (quoting
HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155 (1973)).
65. Compare Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 114
(S.D.N.Y. 1911) (upholding the validity of a patent for purified adrenaline),
affd, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912), with Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28
F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928) (invalidating a patent for "substantially pure
tungsten").
66. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 1, 2-7 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
11, 12-17; H.R. REP. 97-312, at 20-23, microformed on CIS No. 81-H523-22
(Cong. Info. Serv.); The Ninth Annual Judicial Conference on the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 94 F.R.D. 347, 398 (1982)
[hereinafter Judicial Conference] (explaining that Congress created the
Federal Circuit in order to increase the uniformity in the administration of
patent law, thereby creating stability and encouraging investment in patent
technology).
67. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
§ 127(a), 96 Stat. 37, 37-39 (1982) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)
(2000)). Note that prior to the passage of the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, the creation of a specialized appeals court was a subject of frequent
debate. See Cooper, supra note 10, at 380 (suggesting that problems with the
disparate application of patent law can only be remedied through the creation
of a specialized appeals court, and maybe even a specialized trial court);
Thomas W. Shelton, Why a Special Patent Court!, 53 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 403,
403-04 (1921); Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 512 (citing C.A.P.
Turner, Need of a Special Patent Court-The Engineers' Point of View, 93
CENT. L.J. 96, 96-101 (1921)).
68. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 19, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 19.
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protection cases, the Federal Circuit takes exclusive
jurisdiction of an "appeal from a final decision of a district court
was
of the United States ...if the jurisdiction of that court
69
based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title."
Commentators disagree on the propriety of the Federal
Circuit and specialized courts in general. 70 Typically, the
proponents of the Federal Circuit stress that it increases
efficiency and uniformity in the application of patent law to
highly complex and technical issues, thereby reducing forum
71
shopping and increasing the predictability of the law.
Proponents also contend that, from an administrative
standpoint, differentiation based on subject matter as opposed
to geographic location is the only solution to the overburdened
caseloads of the court system. 72 Conversely, opponents of
specialized courts argue that caseload variety is critical to the
proficiency of a court. 73 Concerning the Federal Circuit
specifically, opponents argue that capture theory dictates that
the specialized court will attract jurists overly sympathetic to
patents, and that the court's isolation will foster decisions at
odds with current legal developments. 74 Opponents also fear
that the most qualified jurists will not seek appointment to
75
such a specialized court.
3. Traditional Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1295
After the creation of the Federal Circuit, commentators
were not in agreement as to the scope of the court's
jurisdiction. 76 As a result of § 1295 predicating the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction on the existence of original jurisdiction in
the district courts, the debate largely concerned the
significance of "arising under" in § 1338 and "in whole or in
part" in § 1295. 77 With respect to "arising under," as described
previously in the context of original jurisdiction, debate
69.
70.

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).
Dreyfuss, supra note 62, at 2-3.

71.

Id. at 2.

72.

Id.

73.

Id. at 2-3.

74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 30-52.
77. See id. (explaining the procedural confusion existing after the creation
of the Federal Circuit, and highlighting the ambiguity of "arising under" and
"in whole or in part"); supra text accompanying notes 41, 69 (providing the
relevant statutory provisions).
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centered on whether the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction
would be confined to situations in which the district court had
exercised jurisdiction over a plaintiffs patent claim in
78
accordance with the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Early Federal Circuit opinions indicated that appellate
jurisdiction under § 1295 would not be limited by the wellpleaded complaint rule. In Schwarzkopf Development Corp.,
the Federal Circuit explained that the patent counts of a
counterclaim are within the court's appellate jurisdiction
because they are based "in part" on § 1338.79 In the same term,
the Federal Circuit stated that "the mere labeling and
sequencing of pleadings in the trial tribunal cannot be allowed
80
to control every exercise of this court's appellate jurisdiction."
Other circuit courts accepted this interpretation, transferring
cases that presented a nonfrivolous patent counterclaim to the
Federal Circuit. 8 1 Although patent counterclaims appeared to
be in the province of the Federal Circuit, other jurisdictional
issues, such as situations in which the only patent issue was
82
raised in a defense, remained unresolved.
a. Christianson v. Colt Industries: CircumscribingFederal
CircuitJurisdiction
The Supreme Court's decision in Christianson v. Colt
Industries Operating Corp.8 3 clarified some of the issues
regarding the scope of the Federal Circuit's subject matter
jurisdiction.8 4 Christianson initiated a suit in federal district
court against Colt, alleging that Colt's conduct had driven
Christianson out of business 85 in violation of multiple federal
78.

See Dreyfuss, supra note 62, at 30-37 (describing the ambiguous state

of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, and the lack of guidance provided by the
case law).
79. 800 F.2d 240, 244 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
80. In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
81. See Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 825 F.2d 604, 608 (1st Cir. 1987).
82. Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 31, at 1837.
83. 486 U.S. 800, 807-14 (1988).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 93, 94.
85. Colt was a manufacturer of M16 rifles and M16 rifle parts.
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 804. Although Colt had managed to obtain
numerous patents pertaining to the mass production of the rifles and their
associated parts, Colt had strategically made only limited disclosures in the
patent specifications regarding aspects of the manufacturing processes. Id.
Due to its trade secrecy, as a condition of employment, Colt contractually
required Christianson to agree not to disclose any of the proprietary
information withheld from Colt's patent specifications that Christianson
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antitrust provisions. 86 Although the federal district court
exercised original jurisdiction based on a cause of action arising
under federal antitrust law,8 7 Christianson's claims depended
largely on whether Colt's patents were valid.8 8 When the
district court granted Christianson's motion for summary
judgment, it invalidated nine of Colt's patents.8 9
Colt appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit on the
ground that the summary judgment decision required the
resolution of a patent law issue, the validity of Colt's patents. 90
After a jurisdictional dispute between the Federal Circuit and
the Seventh Circuit, 9 1 the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction because the patent law
92
issue was not necessary to the overall success of the claim.
Drawing on the reasoning of the well-pleaded complaint rule,
the Court stated that in order to "arise under" federal patent
law, either patent law must create the cause of action, or the
theory of recovery must depend on the resolution of a patent
law question. 93 Accordingly, the Court stated that neither a
obtained through employment with Colt. Id. After leaving Colt in 1975,
Christianson started selling M16 parts through his own business,
International Trade Services, and obtained waivers regarding some of Colt's
trade secrets covered by the employment agreement. Id. Nevertheless, when
Christianson entered the market, Colt informed customers that Christianson
was "illegally misappropriating Colt's trade secrets." Id. at 805.
86. Id. Colt answered with a defense asserting that its conduct was
justified based on a need to protect trade secrets, and also included various
counterclaims alleging misappropriation of proprietary information. Id. at
806.
87. Id. at 805 (stating that Christianson's antitrust cause of action was
based on provisions of the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act).
88. Christianson's theories for recovery were premised on the argument
that Colt's patents were invalid for failure to satisfy the enablement and best
mode requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 806. Specifically, Christianson
argued that the patents were invalid for failure to disclose the information
retained as trade secrets. Id. Christianson further argued that, as a result of
Colt benefiting from patents that were invalid due to the failure to disclose
trade secrets, the court should treat the situation as if Colt had disclosed the
information to the public, thereby invalidating the trade secrets. Id. In sum,
the theory for invalidating Colt's trade secrets was dependent on finding Colt's
patents invalid.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Believing that it lacked jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit originally
transferred the case to the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 806-07. Refusing to accept
jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit then sent the case back to the Federal
Circuit. Id.
92. Id. at 810.
93. Id. at 809-10; see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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case containing a defense sounding in patent law nor one in
which patent law was the basis for one of alternative theories of
recovery would satisfy the "arising under" requirement of
§ 1338. 94 Although a concurrence favored a more flexible
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule, 95 the majority's
reasoning echoed the teachings of the well-pleaded complaint
rule, and foretold a restriction on the Federal Circuit's
96
appellate jurisdiction.
b. Aerojet: A Modified Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
After Christianson,it appeared that a patent counterclaim
would not establish a claim "arising under" patent law and
thus would not confer appellate jurisdiction on the Federal
Circuit. 97 This perception proved unfounded in Aerojet-General
Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd. 98 In
January of 1987, Aerojet-General Corp. (Aerojet) filed a
complaint against Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd.
(MTW) in federal district court, alleging, among other things,
unfair competition and seeking a declaratory judgment that
Aerojet had not misappropriated MTW's trade secrets. 99 The
federal district court exercised original jurisdiction based on
both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 00
1 In response,
MTW filed a compulsory counterclaim 10 1 containing two counts
94.

Christianson,486 U.S. at 809-10.

95. See id. at 822-24 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that, in light of
Congress's intent of unifying patent law and removing technically difficult
cases from the purview of the circuit courts, it would be illogical to deny the
Federal Circuit jurisdiction over amended complaints).
96. See Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 31, at 1837-38 (stating that the

Christiansondecision seemed to indicate that the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
would be governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule).
97. Although the Court did not explicitly address the jurisdictional issue
in the context of patent counterclaims, the Court held that the Federal Circuit
lacked jurisdiction over the case because a claim "arising under" patent law
did not appear on the face of the plaintiffs complaint. Christianson,486 U.S.
at 809.

98. 895 F.2d 736, 745 (1990) (en banc) (holding that the well-pleaded
complaint rule does not restrict the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over
compulsory patent counterclaims).
99. Id. at 737-38.
100. Id. at 738. The presence of a federal question was grounded on the
declaratory judgment that Aerojet had not misappropriated trade secrets and,
therefore, had not violated 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Id. at 737, 738 n.1.

101. Recall that a compulsory counterclaim means that the claim "arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a); see supra note 49.
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of patent infringement. 10 2 After the district court ordered
arbitration of all the claims, Aerojet filed an interlocutory
appeal to the Federal Circuit, which necessitated a
determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction existed
under § 1295.103 This required the Federal Circuit to confront
the specific issue of whether the Supreme Court's decision in
Christianson allowed the Federal Circuit to exercise appellate
jurisdiction over a case in which the district court's original
jurisdiction was not based on § 1338, but where there was a
counterclaim that would have conferred § 1338 jurisdiction 10on4
the district court "if the counterclaim had been a complaint."
Notwithstanding the Christianson decision, the Federal
Circuit concluded that it had exclusive jurisdiction over
compulsory patent counterclaims regardless of whether a
patent claim appeared in the complaint.' 0 5 In distinguishing
Christianson,the Federal Circuit explained that Christianson
merely held that patent issues would not create appellate
jurisdiction under § 1295 and, consequently, had no binding
effect on patent claims appearing in a nonfrivolous
counterclaim. 106 Although the court recognized the utility of
the principles of the well-pleaded complaint rule in separating
patent law claims from patent law issues, the Federal Circuit
did not interpret Christianson as a mandate for a rigid
07
application of this rule. 1
In support of this contention, the court emphasized
Congress's goal of instilling uniformity in the application of the
patent laws 10 8 and highlighted Supreme Court precedent
indicating that flexibility and pragmatism should be the focus
of jurisdictional inquiries. 0 9 Additionally, the court noted that
given the purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule to avoid

102. Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 738.
103. The Federal Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292. Id. As a result of the predication of § 1292 on whether the
Federal Circuit would have jurisdiction had the appeal been based on § 1295,
the Federal Circuit first had to determine if it would have jurisdiction under
§ 1295. Id. at 738 n.2.
104. Id. at 738.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 744-45 (explaining that Congress intended to create uniform
patent law and reduce the pervasive forum shopping among the circuit courts
through the creation of the Federal Circuit).
109. See id.
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"potentially serious federal-state conflicts," 110 in the unique
appellate context created by § 1295, it seemed illogical to
distinguish between a well-pleaded claim labeled as a
complaint and a well-pleaded claim labeled as a
counterclaim.'
Finally, although the legislative history of
§ 1295 stated that cases would be within the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction "in the same sense that cases are said to 'arise
under' federal law for purposes of federal question
jurisdiction," 112 the court explained that counterclaims had
been used frequently to establish federal question
11 3
jurisdiction.
c. Post-Aerojet:Expansion of a Modified Well-Pleaded
ComplaintRule
After Aerojet, the Federal Circuit continued to apply a
relaxed version of the well-pleaded complaint rule to its
jurisdiction inquiries. 114 Other circuit courts also cited the
Aerojet decision with approval. 115 Nine years after Aerojet, in
DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications,Inc., the
Federal Circuit further expanded its jurisdiction by holding
that, in addition to compulsory counterclaims, it also had
116
appellate jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims.

110. Id. at 743 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)).

111. See id. at 742 (implying that in the appellate context there is not a
dispute between federal and state jurisdiction).
112. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. 97-312, at 41 (1981), microformed on CIS No.
81-H523-22 (Cong. Info. Serv.)).
113. See id. at 742-43 (citing cases indicating that a counterclaim provides

an independent basis for federal jurisdiction after the complaint is dismissed).
114.

See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.

115. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 813 n.6, 815 (7th Cir. 1999);
Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1996).
Incidentally, it was with the Seventh Circuit that the Federal Circuit had its
jurisdictional dispute in Christianson. See supra note 91 and accompanying

text.
116.

170 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[A]ny counterclaim raising a

nonfrivolous claim of patent infringement is sufficient to support this court's
appellate jurisdiction."), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999). See supra note 49
(distinguishing a compulsory counterclaim from a permissive counterclaim).
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II. REINING IN THE SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
AND THE HOLMES FALL-OUT
Until recently, federal courts appeared resolute that,
regardless of whether a patent claim was present in the
complaint, the Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction over
In June 2002,
cases containing a patent counterclaim."
however, in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, the Supreme Court overruled all precedent
subscribing to this notion by holding that the Federal Circuit
did not have jurisdiction over a case containing a compulsory
patent counterclaim unless a patent claim was also present on
the face of the plaintiffs complaint.1 8 The ramifications of
Holmes extend beyond the issue of the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction due to the predication of the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction on the existence of original jurisdiction in
the federal district court. In response to Holmes, one state
court has already retained jurisdiction over a copyright
counterclaim, 119 indicating that it is only a matter of time
before a state court retains jurisdiction over a patent
20
counterclaim.
At the time of the litigation in Holmes, Vornado Air
Circulation Systems, Inc. (Vornado) was a manufacturer of fans
and heaters and had successfully prosecuted several patents
pertaining to fans and heaters. 12 1 In 1992, Vornado instigated
a lawsuit,122 alleging that Duracraft infringed Vornado's tradedress relating to a "spiral grill design." 123 On appeal, the Tenth
117. See supra Part I.B.3.b, c (explaining that the Federal Circuit interpreted § 1295 as conferring exclusive jurisdiction over all cases having a
compulsory or permissive patent counterclaim).
118. 122 S. Ct. 1889, 1893-95 (2002).
119. Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 790-94 (Ind.
2002) (following the reasoning of Holmes and holding that a state court may
exercise jurisdiction over a copyright counterclaim when the complaint lacks a
well-pleaded copyright claim); see also infra notes 150-51 and accompanying
text.
120. Section 1338 governs exclusive federal jurisdiction over both patents
and copyrights. See supra text accompanying note 41.
121. Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
122. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d
1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
123. Id. at 1499-1500. Trade-dress infringement gives rise to a federal
cause of action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2000). The statute provides protection for distinctive and non-functional
features of a product. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775
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Circuit held that Vornado did not have enforceable trade-dress
rights in the grill design. 124 In spite of the Duracraftdecision,
Vornado filed a complaint with the International Trade
Commission (ITC) in 1999, alleging that The Holmes Group,
Inc. (Holmes Group) infringed both its patent and the same
trade-dress that the Tenth Circuit had previously held
unenforceable in Duracraft.'25 In response to the ITC filing,
the Holmes Group filed a declaratory judgment in federal
district court seeking a ruling that it did not infringe Vornado's
trade-dress. 126 Vornado's answer contained a compulsory
counterclaim for patent infringement. 127 The district court held
that collateral estoppel12 8 prevented Vornado from relitigating
its trade-dress rights and stayed the proceedings relating to the
counterclaim. 21 9 Vornado appealed the decision to the Federal
Circuit. 130 After dismissing the Holmes Group's challenge to
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, the court vacated the district
court's decision and remanded the case.'13 Subsequently, the
Holmes Group appealed to the Supreme Court, specifically
challenging the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. 132
The issue before the Court was whether "the Federal
Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over a case in which the
complaint does not allege a claim arising under federal patent
law, but the answer contains a patent-law counterclaim." 3 3
More specifically, because § 1295 is predicated on § 1338, the
Court had to determine if a counterclaim "arises under" patent
law. 134 In concluding that a counterclaim could not "arise
under" patent law, the Court explained that allowing a
counterclaim to satisfy the requirements of the well-pleaded
complaint rule would undermine the established policies that

(1992).
124. Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
125. Id.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See generally Rachel Marie Clark, Note, CollateralEstoppel of Claim
Interpretation After Markman, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1581, 1589-93 (2002)
(discussing the fundamental elements of collateral estoppel and res judicata).
129. Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 1893.
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the rule was designed to protect. 35 First, it would undermine
the notion that the plaintiff is the "master of the complaint" by
allowing the defendant to remove a case to a federal court
based on a counterclaim filed in state court. 136 Second,
allowing removal based on a federal counterclaim filed in state
court would not properly respect the sovereignty of state
courts. 37 Third, if counterclaims could be used to determine
jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint rule would no longer
serve as a "quick rule of thumb" in determining jurisdiction at
38
the inception of a lawsuit.
The Court also rejected the argument that an exception
should be created that allows the Federal Circuit to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over patent counterclaims. 139 As in
Christianson, the Court emphasized that "[1]inguistic
consistency" required interpreting § 1338 in the same manner
as § 1331.140 Moreover, in executing its task of deciphering
"what the words of the statute must fairly be understood to
mean," the Court did not think it appropriate to consider
Congress's objectives in enacting the statute.""a
Although
conceding that its prior decisions did not explicitly reach the
issue of whether a counterclaim is sufficient to create federal
question jurisdiction, 142 the Court concluded that the only fair
meaning of "arising under" in § 1338 was that of the wellpleaded complaint rule. 43 As emphasized by the Court, this
means the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction is limited to
cases in which the plaintiff stated a claim "arising under"
135. Id. at 1894.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1894-95.
140. Id. at 1893 (alteration in original) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988)).
141.

Id. at 1895.

142.

Id. at 1893.

143.

Id. at 1895. While arriving at the same conclusion, some members of

the Court departed from this rigid application of the well-pleaded complaint
rule in cases involving patent law. For example, Justice Stevens thought the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction should be limited to situations in which the
patent claim appeared in either the plaintiffs original complaint or the
plaintiffs amended complaint. Id. at 1896-97 (Stevens, J., concurring). More
notably, Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor thought the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction should simply be limited to claims actually adjudicated by a
federal district court. Id. at 1898 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). At the district

court level, the proceedings were stayed before the patent counterclaim was
actually litigated. Id. at 1892.
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44
patent law.1

III. IN ARRIVING AT A "FAIR UNDERSTANDING" OF
"ARISING UNDER" THE COURT IGNORED
ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, LEGISLATIVE
INTENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY
In Holmes, the Supreme Court decided two issues. First,
with respect to § 1331, 41 a counterclaim grounded in federal
law will not create a federal question due to the meaning that
146
the well-pleaded complaint rule attributes to "arising under."
Second, "arising under," in the context of § 1338, must be
interpreted in an identical manner as § 1331.147 As a result, a
patent counterclaim will not "arise under" patent law for
purposes of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. 4 8
Although the Court did not explicitly hold that a state court
may exercise jurisdiction over a patent counterclaim, such a
conclusion was necessarily implicated by the Holmes
decision. 149 In rejecting the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, the
Court reasoned that it would be "an unprecedented feat of
interpretive necromancy" to interpret § 1338 in one manner for
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction and in another manner for the
jurisdiction of the district courts. 50 This suggests that federal
district courts only have jurisdiction over a patent claim when
it is present on the face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded
151
complaint.
In concluding that "arising under" must be interpreted
identically in § 1331 and § 1338, the Court adhered to its task
of deciphering what "the words of the statute must fairly be
144. Id. at 1895.
145.

See supra Part I.A.1 (explaining court interpretations of § 1331 and

the well-pleaded complaint rule).
146.
147.

See Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1893-94.
See id. at 1894-95.

148. See id. Recall that the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 1295, which is predicated on the district court having jurisdiction
based "in whole or in part" on § 1338. See supra text accompanying note 69.
149. Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 793-94 (Ind.
2002) (concluding that a compulsory counterclaim for copyright infringement
is not within the exclusive province of the federal courts); see infra notes 15051 and accompanying text.
150. Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1895.

151. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(explaining that after Holmes, "the well-pleaded complaint rule governs

district court patent jurisdiction under § 1338 to the same extent that it
governs the existence of general federal question jurisdiction under § 1331").
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understood to mean."152 The Court indicated that Congress's
choice to use "arising under" in a statute established "strong
evidence" that Congress intended to invoke the well-pleaded
complaint rule. 153 Although the use of similar or identical
language in multiple statutes may provide strong evidence of
intent to enact similar meaning, the Court overlooked an
54
important point: "Strong evidence" is not conclusive evidence.
Even strong evidence can be rebutted, and a proper analysis of
(1) precedent, (2) legislative intent, and (3) public policy reveals
that Congress did not intend to invoke the Court's rigid
interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule when it
enacted § 1295.
A. HOLMES IGNORED FEDERAL AND STATE COURT PRECEDENT

The Court's holding in Holmes overruled decades of federal
and state case law. 155 In its decision, the Court stated that it is
"well established that 'arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents' invokes, specifically, the well-pleadedcomplaint rule." 156
Given the Court's prior holding in
Christianson, this statement alone is not surprising or
unsettling. 157 The Court's conclusion that patent counterclaims
do not arise under patent law, however, is a startling, rigid
application of the well-pleaded complaint rule that was not
"well-established," but unprecedented.158 The decision ignored
152. Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1895 (emphasis added).
153.

Id. (citing Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp.,

604 F.2d 179, 183 (2d Cir. 1979)).
154.

See, e.g., Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761

(1988) (indicating that legislative history could persuade a court to interpret
identical language in two statutes differently).
155. At the federal level, the decision primarily overruled precedent
regarding the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit over
patent counterclaims. See supra notes 79-81, 97-116 and accompanying text

(describing how courts interpreted § 1295 as conferring exclusive jurisdiction
on the Federal Circuit over compulsory and permissive patent counterclaims);

supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (indicating that the Federal Circuit
also did not consider state courts to have jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims). At the state level, the decision overruled long standing
precedent that state courts do not have jurisdiction over counterclaims based
on patent or copyright law. See supra note 54 and accompanying.text.
156. Holmes Group, S. Ct. at 1895 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000)).
157. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809-10

(1988) (explaining that a case does not arise under patent law unless patent
law creates the cause of action or the theory of recovery necessarily depends
on an issue of patent law).
158.

Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1893 (admitting that the Court had not
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years of contrary case law indicating that 159
counterclaims, at
least in patent cases, arise under federal law.
Christiansondid not require the strict interpretation of the
well-pleaded complaint rule applied in Holmes. Although in
Christianson the Court held that § 1338 jurisdiction should
only extend to cases in which a patent law claim appears on the
face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint,160 the
jurisdictional dispute was limited to issues relating to the
plaintiffs complaint 161 and did not reach the unique
jurisdictional issues presented by patent counterclaims. 162 In
Christianson, the well-pleaded complaint rule served as an
administrative tool for determining whether the plaintiffs
claim required the application of patent law, or if patent law
163
merely constituted one of multiple theories of recovery.
While administratively useful for determining the legal basis of
a claim, such an application of the well-pleaded complaint rule
does not dictate a conclusion that only the complaint can
establish a claim that "arises under" patent law.
Prior to Holmes, the Federal Circuit's case law-which had
not construed the well-pleaded complaint rule to bar
16 4
jurisdiction over a nonfrivolous patent counterclaim reflected an appreciation of this administrative purpose of the
well-pleaded complaint rule. In Aerojet, the Federal Circuit
interpreted Christianson as stating the proposition that the
165
well-pleaded complaint rule "focuses on claims, not theories."
The Federal Circuit correctly recognized that, although the
well-pleaded complaint rule "helps ferret out claims from
issues," it "says nothing about whether such separation should

addressed the issue of whether a counterclaim could create "arising under"
jurisdiction).
159. Id. at 1896 (Stevens, J., concurring) (pointing out that the majority
ignored "well-reasoned precedent supporting" federal jurisdiction over
compulsory patent counterclaims).
160.
161.

Christianson,486 U.S. at 808-09.
Id. at 805-07; see supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing

how the plaintiffs claims were premised on the validity of Colt's patents).
162. The patent counterclaim jurisdictional issues are unique given
Congress's explicit intent of fostering uniformity in patent law through the
creation of a specialized federal court of appeals. See supra notes 66-69 and
accompanying text.
163. Christianson,486 U.S. at 811-12.

164.
165.

See supra Part I.B.3.b, c.
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd.,

895 F.2d 736, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Christianson,486 U.S. at 801).
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be made only on the basis of the original complaint." 166 This
interpretation was also consistent with the Federal Circuit's
original holding in Christianson, where the Federal Circuit,
like the Supreme Court, did not find subject matter
jurisdiction. 167 Consequently, although the Federal Circuit
incorporated principles of the well-pleaded complaint rule into
its jurisdictional case law, its application proved to be more
168
expansive to decipher claims from issues.
Although Holmes concerned the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction, the Court suggested that § 1338 had never been
interpreted as depriving state courts of jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims. 169 This assertion was striking because the
Court ignored over forty years of state court practice
transferring cases containing patent counterclaims to the
federal courts.1 70 Granted, on federal matters the Supreme
Court's decisions are the law of the land, 171 but an assertion in
stark contrast to established state precedent seems at least
deserving of a footnote. The Court apparently failed to consider
17 2
the ramifications of the Holmes decision on state courts.
Finally, at least in the limited context of appellate
jurisdiction, Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor agreed with the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint
rule in Aerojet.173 Justice Ginsburg indicated that the only

166. Id. (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 820 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
167. Christianson, 822 F.2d at 1553-59 (explaining that the principles of
the well-pleaded complaint rule apply to § 1338, and thus the Federal Circuit
lacks jurisdiction when the patent law issues arise only in anticipation of a
defense or are otherwise not the basis of the claim).
168. See supra Part I.B.3.b, c.
169. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S.
Ct. 1889, 1895 (2002) (implying that state courts are not deprived of
jurisdiction over patent counterclaims because § 1338 must be interpreted in
accordance with the well-pleaded complaint rule).
170. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
171. All federal courts are inferior to the Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1. Additionally, federal law prevails over state law due to the
Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
172. For example, the Court did not consider whether the state court
practice of transferring patent cases to the federal district courts reflected a
lack of desire to adjudicate such cases. If, as the Court suggests, "arising
under" in § 1338 clearly invokes the well-pleaded complaint rule, it is difficult
to explain the long-standing state court practice of transferring cases
containing patent or copyright counterclaims to the federal courts. See supra
note 54.
173. See Holmes Group, 122 S.Ct. at 1898 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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reason she agreed with the outcome was because a patent claim
was not actually adjudicated. 174 This suggests that if the
district court had adjudicated the patent counterclaim, Justice
Ginsburg would have found exclusive appellate jurisdiction in
the Federal Circuit based "in whole or in part" on § 1338.175
The special circumstances underlying the creation of the
Federal Circuit, however, were largely responsible for the
176
concurrence's departure from the majority's reasoning.
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg noted that the case involved
only a question of jurisdictional authority among the Federal
Circuit and the other federal courts of appeals, and not any
question of the plaintiff's choice of forum. 177 Based on these
comments, it appears Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor would
likely agree that § 1338 does not deprive a state court from
entertaining a patent counterclaim.
Although the Court may cast the Holmes decision as a
logical application of the well-pleaded complaint rule and a
mere extension of its prior holding in Christianson,the decision
is in direct conflict with established federal and state court
precedent. 78 On multiple occasions the Federal Circuit
exercised jurisdiction over cases in which the only patent claim
appeared in the counterclaim. 79 State courts also had a
practice of transferring cases containing a patent or copyright
counterclaim to the federal district courts. 180 In reaching a fair
understanding of "arising under," the Court did not properly
consider the precedential significance of these cases.

174. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Recall that in Holmes, the district court
had stayed the proceedings relating to the counterclaim. Supra note 129 and

accompanying text.
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000) (establishing exclusive jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit over appeals from district courts that had jurisdiction
based on § 1338).
176. See Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1898 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing
Dreyfuss, supra note 62, at 30-37, and explaining that Congress created the

Federal Circuit in an attempt to "eliminate forum shopping and to advance
uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal patent law").
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
See supra notes 54, 79-81, 97-98, 115-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-80, 98, 116 and accompanying text.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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B. HOLMES DOES NOT REFLECT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF
THE

FCIA

The legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement
Act (FCIA) suggests that Congress intended a nonfrivolous
counterclaim to invoke exclusive federal jurisdiction under
§ 1338, in both the original and appellate jurisdictional
contexts. Unfortunately, the clarity of the evidence is obscured
by the inclusion of one particular statement: "Cases will be
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in the same sense that cases are said to 'arise under'
federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction."' 8'
The Court has interpreted this statement as evidence that
Congress intended the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to be
governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule.18 2 Extending this
interpretation to preclude exclusive jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims, however, is unfounded for three reasons: (1) it
promotes Congress's knowledge of legal doctrine to an
unwarranted status; (2) it considers the statement out of
context; and (3) other legislative evidence suggests that when
Congress enacted the FCIA, it assumed § 1338 conferred
exclusive original jurisdiction over patent counterclaims on the
federal district courts.
First, even if Congress intended "arising under" in § 1338
to have the identical meaning as in § 1331 when it enacted the
FCIA, no federal authority had ruled on the issue of
counterclaims in the § 1331 context.1 83 Consequently, although
the Holmes opinion contends that it is an obvious corollary of
Supreme Court case law that a counterclaim is insufficient to
establish "arising under" jurisdiction, 184 it is not reasonable to
assume that Congress had such legal insight when it enacted
§ 1295.185 Similarly, it is also unreasonable to assume that

181. H.R. REP. 97-312, at 41 (1981), microformed on CIS No. 81-H523-22
(Cong. Info. Serv.).
182. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 814 (1988).
183. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct.
1889, 1893 (2002) (explaining that to date, although the Court had used the
well-pleaded complaint rule to establish that a defense could not arise under
federal law, the rule had not been applied to a counterclaim).
184. Id. at 1894.
185. In 1983, the Court noted that a single definition of "arising under" had
not been established. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983); see Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 31, at 1841 (stating
that a definition of "arises under" has consistently eluded courts).
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Congress had such legal insight when it enacted § 1338.186
Because it is likely that Congress did not know how the courts
would interpret counterclaim jurisdiction in the § 1331 context,
the Court should have considered the collective legislative
history in determining the § 1338 meaning of "arising under."
Second, the context of the "arising under" statement in the
legislative history indicates that Congress was simply
concerned with the disposition of frivolous or otherwise
unfounded patent claims, and in no way intended to deprive
the federal courts of jurisdiction over a well-pleaded patent
counterclaim. The reference to federal question jurisdiction
was made to alleviate concerns that "specious and peripheral
patent claims" would give the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over
cases that were otherwise governed by a non-patent area of the
law. 8 7 This indicates that Congress believed the "arising
under" requirement would simply prevent a party from
manipulating the disposition of a case on appeal by pleading
frivolous patent claims or raising patent law issues in the trial
court. 88 Additionally, Congress explained that § 1338 created
a
substantial
jurisdictional
requirement,
and
that
"[i]mmaterial, inferential, and frivolous allegations of patent
questions" would not confer original jurisdiction in the district
court, and therefore would also not establish appellate
jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit.' 9 This again illustrates
that Congress's motivation was only to ensure that mere patent
law issues or frivolous patent claims would not "arise under"
patent law.
Finally, other legislative evidence suggests that Congress
intended the district courts to have subject matter jurisdiction
over a nonfrivolous patent counterclaim. During the enactment
of the FCIA, Congress explained the gate-keeping role of the
district courts in distinguishing frivolous and nonfrivolous
patent claims: "Federal district judges are encouraged ... to
ensure the integrity of the jurisdiction of the federal court of
186. Although Congress enacted § 1338 in 1948, the "arising under"
language dates back to the Revised Statutes of 1874. See Chung, supra note
42, at 721.
187. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 41 (1981), microformed on CIS No. 81H523-22 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
188. See Hale, supra note 35, at 263 (explaining that Congress only
intended § 1295 to preclude issue jurisdiction).
189. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 41, microformed on CIS No. 81-H523-22
(Cong. Info. Serv.); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 19 (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29.

2003]

JURISDICTION OVER PATENT CLAIMS

2161

appeals by separating final decisions on claims involving
substantial antitrust issues from trivial patent claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims, or third party claims raised to
This indicates that
manipulate appellate jurisdiction."' 90
Congress believed the district courts to have jurisdiction over
non-trivial patent counterclaims. Otherwise it would have only
been necessary for Congress to state that the district courts
should separate final decisions on antitrust issues from trivial
patent claims.'91
Although Congress stated that § 1338 should be
interpreted in the same manner as § 1331, when considered
collectively, the foregoing arguments indicate that Congress did
not intend to deprive the federal district courts, and thus the
Federal Circuit, of § 1338 jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims. In particular, the reference to § 1331 lacks
significance in the counterclaim jurisdictional context because
the Court only recently addressed the issue of counterclaim
jurisdiction in the Holmes decision. It would be unreasonable
to assume that Congress had the foresight required to
anticipate the Court's interpretation. Such lack of foresight is
reflected in statements in the legislative history of the FCIA
suggesting that nonfrivolous patent counterclaims would "arise
92
under" patent law. 1
C. HOLMES THREATENS PUBLIC POLICY

The Court's distinction between patent claims appearing in
a complaint and those appearing in a counterclaim also
undermines public policy because it increases the likelihood of
uncertainty and disparity in the application of patent law.
With respect to federal appellate jurisdiction, directing appeals

190. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 20 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 30.
191. Statements by Frank P. Cihlar, both an expert and a contributor to
the FCIA, also support this contention that patent counterclaims have an
independent jurisdictional basis, thereby giving the Federal Circuit
jurisdiction based "in part" on § 1338. Judicial Conference, 94 F.R.D. 347,
404-05 (1982) (explaining that, by definition, a permissive counterclaim would
have an independent jurisdictional basis, and suggesting that a compulsory
counterclaim for patent infringement would too). In 1979, Cihlar was
recruited to work on the FCIA as a member of the Improvements of
Administration of Justice office. Id. at 399. In addition to making the
substantive legislative proposals, Cihlar acted as a liaison between Congress
and the White House. Id.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 190-91.
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that involve a patent counterclaim to the federal circuit courts
conflicts directly with the specific FCIA objectives of creating
uniformity and predictability in patent law. 193 The Federal
Circuit was created largely in reaction to the belief that the
disparate application of patent law among the federal circuits
and the resulting forum shopping weakened the patent system
and hampered technological innovation. 194 Allowing the federal
circuit courts to render decisions on patent counterclaims
hinders the effectiveness of Congress's chosen solution. With
respect to the state court ramifications of Holmes, given that
Congress found impropriety in the adjudication of patent
claims in the federal circuit courts, it is reasonable to assume
that Congress would similarly find impropriety in state court
adjudication of patent claims.
Although forum shopping may not appear to be an obvious
result of Holmes, it is one of the major causes of the public
policy concerns attributable to Holmes. The decision allows a
manipulative plaintiff to avoid Federal Circuit review by
carefully filing a claim that does not "arise under" patent law
but is sufficiently related to a defendant's potential patent
claim as to create a compulsory patent counterclaim.195 In such
a situation, the defendant must file the patent counterclaim or
forego bringing the claim in a subsequent proceeding. 196 At the
federal level, this will result in horizontal forum shopping
among the district courts with the intent of litigating the case
in a circuit favorable to the plaintiffs position. 197 Allowing
state court jurisdiction over patent counterclaims only
193.

See supra Part I.B.1, 2 (describing the circuit courts of appeals crisis

prior to 1982 and Congress's solution through enactment of the FCIA).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20, microformed on CIS No. 81-H523-22

(Cong. Info. Serv.); supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
195. Holmes presents one scenario of how this type of forum manipulation
could occur. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (describing how
Vornado first filed a complaint with the ITC alleging patent and trade-dress

infringement by the Holmes Group, and in response, the Holmes Group filed a
declaratory judgment with respect to the trade-dress issue, thereby forcing
Vornado to responded with a compulsory counterclaim for patent
infringement); see also supra note 49 (describing the differences between a
compulsory and permissive counterclaim).
196. See Mesker Bros. Iron Co. v. Donata Corp., 401 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir.
1968) (describing the consequences of foregoing a counterclaim in contract
law); supra note 49.
197. See Thomas G. Slater Jr. & Tyler Maddry, Analysis with Holmes,
Supreme Court Expands Patent Jurisdictionof Regional Circuits and States,

PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Nov. 2002, LEXIS, Secondary Legal, Legal News
File (explaining that the Holmes decision will increase forum shopping).
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increases the forum-shopping possibilities; the manipulative
plaintiff will have the opportunity to forum shop vertically
between the state and federal trial courts, as well as
horizontally among the state courts.
In the federal courts, for example, a plaintiffs antitrust or
trade-dress claim may be intimately related to a defendant's
potential claim for patent infringement. 198 Therefore, the
plaintiff could manipulate the judicial system by filing the
complaint within the circuit believed most favorable to its
position regarding the defendant's
potential
patent
counterclaim. Similarly, a plaintiff could file a complaint based
on state law in state court, that is logically related to a
potential patent counterclaim.1 99 Because of the legal system's
deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum, the defendant would
not be able to remove the case to federal court based on the
existence of a patent counterclaim. 200 The defendant would
consequently be forced to choose between bringing the cause of
action as a counterclaim in state court or being precluded from
20 1
asserting it in a subsequent case.
Especially considering that the Court does not seem to
expect other circuit courts to apply Federal Circuit
precedent,2 0 2 allowing patent counterclaims in federal circuit
198. See supra note 195; supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text
(explaining how the compulsory counterclaim in Aerojet arose out of the
plaintiffs claim for misappropriation of trade secrets ).
199. E.g., Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 791 (Ind.
2002) (involving a compulsory copyright counterclaim).
200. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10
(1983) ("[A] defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the
plaintiffs complaint establishes that the case 'arises under' federal law.").
201. See supra note 49 (discussing the preclusive effects of not filing a
compulsory counterclaim). Note that generally a state court adjudication is
given preclusive effect in other state and federal district courts. The
Constitution mandates that judgments of a state court be given preclusive
effect in the other state courts. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The full faith and
credit statute directs the federal courts to give preclusive effect' to final
decisions of the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); Chung, supra note
42, at 736. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has explicitly
addressed whether full faith and credit must be given to state court
adjudications of patent claims. See Chung, supra note 42, at 737-45. The
Court has held however, that the same basic approach to the full faith and
credit analysis applies both to exclusive and concurrent federal jurisdiction.
See id. at 741.
202. Dreyfuss, supra note 62, at 57; see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1889, 1898 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(supporting the outcome by explaining how conflicting decisions of patent
claims by other circuits will help the Court to identify areas of the law needing
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courts presents a significant risk of unsettling the certainty
203
that has been created by the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence.
20 4
Increased uncertainty will likely engender forum shopping,
which will in turn lead to multiple problems that Congress
explicitly intended to solve through the FCIA. For instance,
the commission responsible for the research underlying the
FCIA found that reducing the prevalence of forum shopping
would reduce the overall costs of litigation.2 0 5 Additionally, the
commission found that a specialized appeals court would
reduce the burden on the judicial system by decreasing the
number of appeals. 20 6 Most importantly, predictable patent law
was believed to increase innovation, foster growth, and
20 7
encourage investment in technological industries.
All of these policies would be undermined if a litigant has
208
an opportunity to forum shop throughout the circuit courts.
The cost of litigation will most likely increase because litigants
will pursue appeals to the circuit courts that they would not
have brought to the Federal Circuit.20 9 An increased number of
appeals will correspondingly increase the burden on the courts
of appeals. 210 Perhaps worst of all, the decreased uniformity in
the application of patent law will likely reduce investor
confidence in the value of patents,2 1' which will in turn reduce
clarification and will serve as a protection against institutional bias in the
Federal Circuit).
203. See Hale, supra note 35, at 264 (explaining that, even if the other
circuit courts were to apply Federal Circuit precedent, it is unlikely that the
precedent will be applied consistently to complex patent issues).

204. See Maher, supra note 8, at Bll (stating that the Chief Judge of the
Federal Circuit explained that Holmes is likely to reduce certainty in patent
law and consequently increase forum shopping and devalue patents); supra
note 61 and accompanying text (explaining how forum shopping resulted from

the disparate application of patent law among the circuit courts).
205.
206.
207.
208.

S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15.
Id.
Id. at 6; see also Moore, supra note 8, at 592-93.
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981), microformed on CIS No. 81-

H523-33 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (explaining the negative effects of uncertainty in
the administration of patent law).
209. See id. at 23 ("Removing the incentive to forum-shop also will reduce
costs to litigants."); Moore, supra note 8, at 590.
210. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23, microformed on CIS No. 81-H523-33
(Cong. Info. Serv.) (explaining that uniformity in the application of patent law
will reduce the number of appeals).
211. See id. at 22 (explaining how, prior to the adoption of the Federal

Circuit, investors were skeptical of technological markets due to the
geographical dependence upon the value of a patent); see also Moore, supra

note 8, at 592 (stating that inefficiency and unpredictability in patent law
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2 12
the overall incentive for innovation.
Although directing appeals to the federal circuit courts
undermines the objectives of the FCIA, these public policy
concerns are not as troubling as the implications of the Holmes
over
patent
jurisdiction
on
state
court
decision
counterclaims. 21 3 Given the value and importance attributed to
intellectual property, and patents in particular, 21 4 allowing
state courts to adjudicate patent claims poses substantial
threats to the validity of the patent system and the incentive
Principally this is because
for technological innovation.
allowing state courts to adjudicate patent disputes will
decrease the stability of patent law2 15 and create forumEven under the pre-Holmes
shopping opportunities. 21 6
interpretation of § 1295 and § 1338, exclusive federal
jurisdiction had not created uniform case law in the federal
district courts. 2 17 Vastly increasing the possible number of
independent courts competent of rendering decisions on patent
2 18
claims will undoubtedly compound the uncertainty.
Additionally, merely requiring the state courts to apply Federal
Circuit law will not alleviate the public policy concerns due to

stifle innovation and competition).
212. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 23, microformed on CIS No. 81-H523-33
(Cong. Info. Serv.) (indicating that as the uniformity in the application of
patent law increases, businesses will more easily extract value from the patent
system, which will in turn stimulate technological innovation and strengthen
the national economy); Moore, supra note 8, at 592-93.
213. See Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 792-93
(Ind. 2002) (explaining that the Holmes decision has overruled all established
precedent that held that a state court lacked jurisdiction over a counterclaim
based on § 1338).
214. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
For example,
215. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
commentators have suggested that the limited experience of the state courts
in determining the scope of a patent will create significant disparate outcomes
in state court adjudications. Chung, supra note 42, at 755.
216. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
217. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are DistrictCourt Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11-12 (2001) (providing empirical
evidence that the district courts misconstrue patent claims in over 25% of the
cases); Moore, supra note 8, at 57 tbl.1 (presenting empirical evidence that
forum shopping occurs in the federal district courts in patent cases); Karen
Southwick, Murky Waters in the Gene Pool, FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 58
(explaining that genomics patents are of limited value due to "confusing court
decisions").
218. See Moore, supra note 8, at 592 (explaining that the "unpredictability
in the legal system ... intensifies as the number of potential jurisdictions in
which to bring suit increases").
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the difficulty of consistently applying patent law to the
complicated facts of a case. 21 9 Finally, setting the evils of forum
shopping aside, 220 commentators are skeptical of a state court
unilaterally determining the validity, invalidity, or scope of a
221
national property right.
The uncertainty in the application of patent law by the
federal circuit courts and state trial courts is the underlying
cause of the aforementioned policy concerns. 222 Most notably, a
lack of certainty and predictability will inevitably result in
forum shopping throughout the federal circuit courts and the
state trial courts. 223 Forum shopping in turn will likely cause
still higher litigation costs, overburdened courts, and decreased
investor confidence in the patent system. 224 The risk of
reducing confidence in the patent system is especially acute
when a manipulative plaintiff forces a defendant to bring a
patent counterclaim in an unfavorable forum. 225 This is
because the value of a patent is intimately related to the ability
of its owner to enforce the exclusive right. 226 Therefore, by
depriving a counterclaimant of Federal Circuit review or of a
federal forum entirely, the Holmes decision diminishes the
value of patents and the overall incentive for technological
innovation.

219.

See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,

15 (explaining how. the application of patent law to substantially similar facts
produced different outcomes at different federal circuit courts).
220. Forum shopping in patent cases is believed to increase the cost of
litigation, increase the burden on the courts, and decrease technological
innovation and business growth. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5-6, reprinted in

1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15-16.

It also "conjures negative images of a

manipulable legal system." Moore, supra note 8, at 561.
221. See Cooper, supra note 10, at 315 & n.3 (explaining a common

supposition that a federal court is better equipped to handle a patent dispute);
Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 31, at 1863 (explaining that there is also a
concern that state judges may be more hostile to federal interests than federal

judges).
222.
223.
224.
225.

See
See
See
See

226.

Moore, supra note 8, at 592.

supra text accompanying notes 203-07.
supra text accompanying notes 195-97, 204.
supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE WELL-PLEADED PATENT COUNTERCLAIM
RULE: A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE
WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
Congress should immediately consider legislation to
Specifically,
remedy the result of the Holmes decision.
Congress should clarify that subject matter jurisdiction
determinations over patent counterclaims require the
application of a modified version of the well-pleaded complaint
This modified version-the well-pleaded patent
rule. 227
counterclaim rule-must retain the principles of the wellpleaded complaint rule directed at disposing of frivolous
claims 228 without acting as a per se bar to legitimate patent
claims appearing in a counterclaim instead of in a complaint.
Under this modified standard, rather than dismissing a patent
counterclaim simply based on the absence of a patent claim in
the complaint, the court should apply the principles of the wellpleaded complaint rule to determine if the counterclaim
229
consists of a nonfrivolous claim arising under patent law.
23
0
Depending upon the stage of the litigation, the presence of a
nonfrivolous patent counterclaim under the well-pleaded
patent counterclaim rule will either direct an appeal from a
federal district court to the Federal Circuit, 23 1 or it will require
the removal of a case originally filed in state court to a federal
232
district court.
227. For an overview of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see supra note 36
and accompanying text.
228.

For example, the modified version of the well-pleaded complaint rule

would still focus on whether the resolution of a counterclaim required the
application of patent law. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (finding that the claim did not arise under patent law
because resolution of the claim did not necessarily depend on the application
of patent law).
229. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (explaining the Federal
Circuit's interpretation of the § 1338 "arising under" requirement).
230. At the appellate level, this modified version of the well-pleaded

complaint rule is also applicable to counterclaims arising under plant variety
protection law. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). If the issue concerns state or
federal jurisdiction at the trial court level, then this analysis is also applicable
to copyright counterclaims. Id. § 1338(a).
231. If a claim "arises under" patent or plant variety protection law, the
Federal Circuit retains exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Id. § 1295(a).
232. The Jurisdiction of State Courts over Cases Involving Patents, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 461, 468 & n.39 (1931) (suggesting that if a patent question is

raised by an answer during a state court proceeding, the entire case should be
removed to federal court); see also Cooper, supra note 10, at 391 (stating that
legislation should be enacted for "allowing removal to federal courts" whenever
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The application of the well-pleaded patent counterclaim
rule to determine subject matter jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims is consistent with decades old precedent 233 and
with Congress's goal of creating certainty and predictability in
patent law. 234 This modification also does not substantially
undermine the stated policies of the well-pleaded complaint
rule.235 With respect to the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction, the policy concern of protecting the plaintiffs
forum choice is minimal because the plaintiff has already
chosen a federal forum for the trial. 236 Allowing the Federal
Circuit to exercise jurisdiction over patent counterclaims would
similarly not complicate the administrative process because the
case already would be in federal district court with the only
remaining issue concerning the direction of the appeal. 237 State
sovereignty concerns are similarly not present because the
plaintiff would already have filed the case in federal district
238
court.
The Court's policy concerns regarding original jurisdiction
over patent counterclaims deserve more consideration. The

concerns are outweighed, however, by Congress's intent to
create uniform and predictable patent law. 239 The Court's
strongest argument is with respect to the plaintiffs choice of
forum, since allowing a patent counterclaim to establish
"questions as to the validity or scope of any patent are involved").
233.
234.

See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B.3.
See supra notes 42, 66-69 and accompanying text (explaining

Congress's intent of creating uniformity and predictability in the application of
patent law); supra Part III.B, C (explaining how the rigid application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule in Holmes undermines legislative intent and

public policy).
235. In Homes, the court stated that the well-pleaded complaint rule serves
to preserve the plaintiffs forum choice, respects the independence of the
sovereign states in adjudicating disputes, and serves as a "quick rule of
thumb" in resolving conflicts of jurisdiction. See supra notes 135-38 and

accompanying text.
236. The issue in the appellate context concerns the direction of an appeal
from the final decision of a federal district court, thus the plaintiff would have
already filed suit in federal district court.
237. Dreyfuss, supra note 62, at 36 (arguing that postponing the decision
as to the direction of the appeal until all the pleadings are filed does not
substantially burden the administrative process).
238. Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 31, at 1863.
239.

See Hale, supra note 35, at 263 (stating that, given Congress's intent

of creating uniformity of patent law, the Federal Circuit should not be bound
by the well-pleaded complaint rule in determining if a case "arises under"
patent law).
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exclusive federal jurisdiction would deprive the plaintiff of its
state court choice of forum. 240 This concern is mitigated by the
fact that the federal court will only exercise jurisdiction over a
case in which the counterclaim is not frivolous. 24 1 Additionally,
limiting removal to compulsory counterclaims would further
protect the plaintiffs forum choice. 242 Therefore, the defendant
would not be able to invoke a counterclaim simply to remove
243
the case from state to federal court.
The second concern the Court voiced is that exclusive
federal jurisdiction over counterclaims would disrespect the
sovereignty of the state courts in which the complaint was
originally filed.244 This argument is undermined due to
Congress's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
courts. 245 In the case of patent law, Congress has decided that
the public interest in uniform and predictable law is important
enough to preempt concurrent jurisdiction. 246 The state
practice prior to the Holmes decision of transferring cases
involving § 1338 counterclaims to the federal district courts

240. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct.
1889, 1894 (2002). The presence of a nonfrivolous patent counterclaim would
require the removal of the case from state court to federal court. See supra
note 232 and accompanying text.
241. The legislative history of the FCIA explicitly states that Congress did
not intend the Federal Circuit, and thus the district courts, to have
jurisdiction over frivolous patent claims or counterclaims. See supra notes
189-90 and accompanying text.
242. A party with a permissive patent counterclaim would be required to
file the claim as an independent lawsuit in federal court. See supra note 49
(explaining that a party is free to file a permissive counterclaim in a
subsequent lawsuit).
243. In the event that a federal district court determined a patent
counterclaim to be frivolous after the removal from a state court, the federal
district court should remand the case back to state court. Furthermore, if
evidence substantiated that the defendant had filed the claim simply for the
purposes of delay, or for an otherwise improper motive, the federal district
court would have the option of imposing Rule 11 sanctions. FED. R. Civ. P.
11(b)(1), (c).
244. Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1894.
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
246. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that the general
consensus is that exclusive jurisdiction is intended to create uniformity and
expertise in the application of patent law); cf. supra notes 66-69 and
accompanying text (explaining that Congress created exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit to promote patent law uniformity). If
Congress has not invoked exclusive jurisdiction, state and federal courts
exercise concurrent jurisdiction. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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also mitigates the concern regarding state sovereignty. 24 7
The objective of ensuring the quick disposition of
jurisdictional disputes 248 is also not substantially undermined
by exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent, plant variety
protection, or copyright counterclaims. Counterclaims will
generally be brought in response to the plaintiffs pleadings, so
a jurisdictional dispute will not occur late in trial. And, when a
jurisdictional dispute does arise from a counterclaim, the
principles of the well-pleaded complaint rule will still serve as a
"quick rule of thumb" 249 to determine if the counterclaim arises
under patent, plant variety protection, or copyright law.
Admittedly, the strict application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule in Holmes more closely protects the stated policy
concerns underlying the rule; however, the policy concerns are
substantially weakened in the context of patent claims due to
the legislative goal of creating uniform patent law. Congress
placed the original jurisdiction over patent claims in the
exclusive province of the federal district courts in order to
create uniformity in the application of patent law. 250 Congress
also created the Federal Circuit, providing it with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, to further increase the
uniformity in patent law. 25 1 In order to continue to foster a
uniform and predictable body of patent law, Congress should
enact legislation clarifying that § 1338 "arising under" does not
bar exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent counterclaims.
This well-pleaded patent counterclaim rule more clearly
reflects Congress's intent regarding the exclusivity of federal
jurisdiction in patent law while still ensuring that only
nonfrivolous claims invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The strict textual analysis of "arising under" applied in the
Holmes decision to § 1338 "arising under" jurisdiction has
created a doctrine not warranted by precedent, legislative
history, or public policy. Most strikingly, the decision provides
247. See supra note 54; see also supra note 172 (suggesting that state
courts may not even be interested in retaining jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims).
248. Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1894.
249. Id.
250. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

251. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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a means by which a manipulative plaintiff can forum shop
throughout both the federal circuit courts and the state trial
courts.
To remedy this result, Congress should enact
legislation clarifying its intent that courts should apply a more
expansive version of the well-pleaded complaint rule to § 1338
jurisdiction determinations. Under this well-pleaded patent
counterclaim rule, the principles of the well-pleaded complaint
rule would still determine if a counterclaim is nonfrivolous, but
the rule would not serve as a per se bar against federal
jurisdiction over patent counterclaims.
The well-pleaded
patent counterclaim rule would require the federal district
courts to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims, and the Federal Circuit would consequently
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction based "in part" on § 1338
over any appeal from the district court. Such a construction of
§ 1338 furthers Congress's objective of creating uniformity and
predictability in the application of patent law, thereby fostering
technological innovation and economic stability.
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